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Abstract
Goods are often allocated publically by means of queuing processes in developing countries.
In such situations, which group of citizens should a corrupt government official favor? In addition,
what should be the basis for this favoritism? To the best of our knowledge, these salient questions
have received scant attention in the literature. Consequently, we use queuing theory to first
demonstrate that when allocating goods publically, a case can be made for favoring a particular group
of citizens. Next, we show that the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes received
by the corrupt government official but also on the efficiency with which this official discharges his
duties.
Keywords: Bribery, Corruption, Favoritism, Queuing Theory, Wait Time
JEL Codes: D80, H40, O12
4For more information on this literature, we refer the reader to Alatas (1968), Basu et al. (1992), Besley and McLaren (1993), and
Mookherjee and Png (1995).
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Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing
Countries 
1. Introduction
The public provision of goods is often in the hands of officials who may be inclined to use
their position to favor their own interests. Bribery and corruption are glaring examples of abuse of
positions of power by government officials. Although bribery and corruption may occur in any
country, it is often considered to be a particularly serious problem in developing countries. For
instance, Gilbert (1990) informs us that corruption has plagued the provision of public services in
Columbia. Similarly, Southall (2000) has noted that corruption has caused problems with succession
in Kenya. Finally, Afza (2000) has pointed out that corruption has impeded the efficient allocation
of a whole host of goods and services in Pakistan. Indeed, as Mookherjee and Png (1995) have noted,
corruption does seem to have particularly severe impacts in developing countries. In this regard, the
reader should note that although there are many kinds of corruption, the extant literature on this
subject appears to have focused primarily on enforcement related corruption.4
There is no gainsaying the fact that enforcement related corruption is a salient problem. Even
so, in many developing countries, there is a significant amount of corruption involving the public
allocation of goods. As Batabyal and Yoo (2003) have pointed out, a basic feature of these goods
allocation processes is that they involve queuing by citizens. Put differently, people have to wait in
a queue to obtain the good that is being allocated by a government official. Now, in many cases there
5For specific examples of the public provision of goods that involve queuing, see Wood (1999) and Gunawardana (2000). Wood
(1999) discusses the supply of groundwater by means of tubewells in the Indian state of Bihar and Gunawardana (2000) comments
on the distribution of rice to consumers in Sri Lanka.
6
It is noteworthy that there is a small literature—see in particular Stahl and Alexeev (1985) and Polterovich (1993)—that has
analyzed queuing models of resource allocation in the context of black markets in centrally planned economies. However, the reader
should note that this literature has not specifically studied the questions that we are analyzing in this paper.
7
Textbook accounts of Markovian queues can be found in Ross (2002, chapter 8) and in Ross (2003, chapter 8).
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are scarcity problems in developing countries that prevent all citizens from obtaining a desired
quantity of services simultaneously. This is often the case in the provision of medical care, social
housing, and entrance to schools.5 In these and other instances in which citizens have to queue to
obtain a publically allocated good, it is quite likely that a corrupt government official will be willing
to provide services to citizens at different rates. In other words, it is entirely possible that individuals
with a high opportunity cost of time or with a high level of income will be willing to pay a bribe to
obtain service relatively speedily. In contrast, individuals with a low opportunity cost of time or with
a low level of income are more likely to not pay a bribe and to wait longer in queue for service.
Given the above possibility, it is pertinent to ask the following general question: What are the
connections between bribery, favoritism, and wait times in the public allocation of goods in
developing countries? Surprisingly, there is very little research on this question. In fact, we have been
able to identify only two theoretical papers that have shed light on this important question.6 In an
interesting paper, Lui (1985) uses a queuing model to demonstrate that it is not necessarily true that
government officials will purposely cause delays in a queue to attract more bribes. To demonstrate
this, Lui (1985) studies a Markovian queue.7 Put differently, in Lui’s (1985) model, citizens enter the
queue in accordance with a Poisson process and the service time is exponentially distributed. Even
though Lui (1985) does compute the expected wait time of citizens in the queue, he does not directly
5analyze the bribery/favoritism nexus that we are interested in studying in this paper.
Recently, Batabyal and Yoo (2003) have used a more general queuing approach than Lui’s
(1985) to analyze the differential treatment by a government official of citizens who pay bribes and
those who do not. These researchers have used the expected wait times in queue for citizens who pay
bribes and for those who do not to show that bribery is profitable (less profitable) for citizens with
a high (low) opportunity cost of time. Although their paper does shed light on salient issues
concerning the value of preemption and the benefit from bribery, it leaves two pertinent questions
unanswered. In particular, when goods are allocated publically by means of queuing processes in
developing countries, which group of citizens should a corrupt government official favor? In addition,
what should be the basis for this favoritism? To the best of our knowledge, these important questions
have not been analyzed previously in the literature. Consequently, the present paper has two
objectives. First, we use queuing theory to show that when a good is allocated publically by means
of a queuing process, a case can be made for favoring a particular group of citizens. Next, we show
that the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes received by the corrupt government
official but also, in a specific sense, on the efficiency with which this official discharges his duties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework
in detail. Section 3 first provides evidence to substantiate our claim that when apportioning a good
publically, a case can be made for favoring a particular group of citizens. Next, this section focuses
on the connection between bribes and expected service times and shows that this connection
constitutes the basis for favoritism. Finally, section 4 concludes and discusses ways in which the
research of this paper might be extended. 
2. The Theoretical Framework
8In the remainder of this paper, we shall use the terms “corrupt government official” and “server” interchangeably.
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Consider a corrupt government official (the server)8 who is in charge of allocating a specific
homogeneous good to the citizens of some developing country. To obtain one unit of this good,
citizens must first join a queue and then wait in this queue until it is their turn to be served by this
government official. Any citizen can obtain quicker service by paying a bribe to the server. Further,
citizens are heterogeneous and hence, to model this feature, we shall say that the population in the
developing country under study consists of type I and type II citizens. Many interpretations are
possible for this two part classification. For instance, in the Batabyal and Yoo (2003) classification
scheme, type I citizens are high opportunity cost of time citizens and type II citizens are low
opportunity cost of time citizens. Similarly, type I citizens could be those who have the right
connections and hence are able to influence the corrupt government official. In this interpretation,
type II citizens would be those who have little or no connections and hence are not able to influence
the corrupt government official, or at least not to the same degree as type I citizens.
Type I and type II citizens arrive at the corrupt government official’s service facility—where
the homogeneous good in question is being distributed—in accordance with independent Poisson
processes with rates  and  A bribe  per unit time is received by the server from eachβI βII. Bi, i'I,II,
type  citizen who waits in queue to receive the homogeneous good. It takes a random amount ofi
time to provide service to type I and to type II citizens. Let us denote the amount of time taken to
serve type I and type II citizens by the random variables  and sI sII.
Given  and  can we find a condition that determines which citizen type oughtBI, BII, sI, sII,
to be favored by the server? This is the basic question that we now propose to answer. However,
9In the queuing theory literature, this sort of a queue is sometimes called a non-preemptive priority queue. For more on priority
queues, the reader should consult Ross (2002, chapter 8) and Ross (2003, chapter 8).
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before we move to the specifics of this question, let us first be clear about the sense in which we are
using the word “favored.” To this end, without loss of generality, we shall say that type I citizens are
favored or given service priority over type II citizens if service never commences on a type II citizen
when a type I citizen is waiting in queue. However, if a type II citizen is already being served and a
type I citizen arrives, then the type II citizen continues to receive service until completion, i.e., until
the good being allocated publically is received by this type II citizen. Put differently, while type I
citizens are favored or given service priority, there is no preemption once service on a type II citizen
has commenced.9 We are now ready to proceed with the answer to the question we posed in the first
sentence of this paragraph.
3. Favoritism and the Public Allocation of Goods
3.1. Who to favor?
To answer the above question, we shall proceed by means of four steps. First, we shall
mathematically characterize the average amount of time a citizen spends waiting in queue for our
priority queue or queue with favoritism. Let us denote this expected wait time by  For notationalT N.
ease, let  denote the proportion of all citizens who are type I and let a'βI/(βI%βII) (1&a)'βII/(βI%βII)
denote the proportion of all citizens who are type II. Now recall that the corrupt government official’s
service times for the two types of citizens are random variables denoted by  and  Consequently,sI sII.
let  represent the expected service times for these two types of citizens and letE[si],'1/mi, i'I,II,
 and let rI'βIE[sI] rII'βIIE[sII].
The priority queuing system that we are studying has two types of citizens. Therefore, to
8compute  we must average over both types of citizens. This tells us thatT N,
(1)T N'aT NI %(1&a)T NII ,
where  is the average amount of time a type  citizen spends waiting in queue to obtainT Ni , i'I,II, i
the homogeneous good in question. Now, from equations (3) and (5) in Batabyal and Yoo (2003),
it follows that
 and (2)T NI '
βIE[s
2
I ]%βIIE[s
2
II]
2(1&rI)
T NII '
βIE[s
2
I ]%βIIE[s
2
II]
2(1&rI)(1&rI&rII)
.
Using equations (1) and (2) together, we conclude that
(3)T N' {βIE[s
2
I ]%βIIE[s
2
II]}{a(1&rI&rII)%(1&a)}
2(1&rI&rII)(1&rI)
.
We now have a mathematical characterization of the expected amount of time a citizen spends
waiting in a queue. This also completes the first step in the four step procedure that we alluded to in
the first paragraph of this section.
Our next task is to determine the average amount of time spent by a citizen waiting in a queue
when there is no favoritism demonstrated by the server. Although one can model the lack of
favoritism in a variety of ways, the simplest way is to suppose that our server allocates the
homogeneous good in question to citizens on a first-come-first-served or FIFO basis. When the good
in question is allocated on a FIFO basis, the queuing model with favoritism that we have been
10
In the notation M/G/1, the M means that the arrival process is Poisson and hence the time between successive arrivals is exponential
or Markovian. The G refers to the fact that the service times have a general distribution function. Finally, the 1 refers to the fact
that there is a single server. For more on M/G/1 queues, see Ross (2002, chapter 8) and Ross (2003, chapter 8).
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analyzing thus far becomes the well known M/G/1 queue10 in which the arrival rate of citizens is
 Therefore, using equation 8.36 in Ross (2002, p. 256) we can infer that the expectedβ'βI%βII.
amount of time spent by citizens waiting in queue,  is T NFIFO,
(4)T NFIFO'
{βIE[s 2I ]%βIIE[s 2II]}
2(1&rI&rII)
@
(1&rI)
(1&rI)
.
With equation (4) in place, we have now completed the second step in the four step procedure that
we alluded to earlier. 
Our third task is to determine when the expected wait of citizens in queue with favoritism is
less than the expected wait without any favoritism. In other words, with regard to the wait time in
queue, we would like to know when it makes sense for the server to favor one or the other type of
citizen. Mathematically, we want to determine when  To accomplish this task, let us useT N<T NFIFO.
equations (3) and (4). Comparing these two equations, it is clear that
(5)T N<T NFIFO]a(&rI&rII)#&rI]arII>(1&a)rI]
βIβIIE[sII]
βI%βII
>
βIIβIE[sI]
βI%βII
]E[sII]>E[sI]]mI>mII.
Equation (5) provides the answer to the question we posed at the beginning of the previous
paragraph. In particular, this equation tells us that the average wait of citizens in queue with
favoritism is less than the average wait of citizens in queue without favoritism if and only if the mean
time it takes to provide service to type II citizens is greater than the mean time it takes to provide
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service to type I citizens. Put differently, from a waiting time perspective, favoring type I citizens over
type II citizens makes sense if and only if the expected service time for type II citizens is greater than
the expected service time for type I citizens. We are now in a position to undertake the fourth and
final step in the four step procedure that we have been following thus far.
Recall that a bribe  per unit time is received by the server from each type  citizenBi, i'I,II, i
who waits in queue to receive the homogeneous good. Equation (5) tells us that if  thenmI>mII
 In words, when  it makes sense for the server to favor type I citizens because suchT N<T NFIFO. mI>mII,
favoritism minimizes the average wait time of citizens in queue. Now, without going through all the
mathematical details, note that the argument that led to the above stated result from equation (5) also
works when  In other words,  implies that  This gives us theBImI>BIImII. BImI>BIImII T
N<T NFIFO.
answer to the “Who to favor?” question and we now state this answer as
LEMMA 1: In a situation of favoritism, if  then the server ought to favor type IE[sI]/BI<E[sII]/BII
citizens over type II citizens when publically allocating the homogeneous good in question.
3.2. Why to favor?
We now address the second question of this paper: Given  and  can we obtainBI, BII, sI, sII,
a condition that specifies which citizen type ought to be favored by the server? This is the basic
question that we had posed in section 2 and Lemma 1 provides the answer to this question. As we
can see from this Lemma, type I citizens should be favored over type II citizens because, for type I
citizens, the ratio of the expected service time to the received bribe is less than the corresponding
ratio for type II citizens. 
It is not difficult to show that if the ratio of the expected service time to the received bribe for
type I citizens is greater than the corresponding ratio for type II citizens then type II citizens ought
11
to be favored in the public allocation of the homogeneous good. From a mathematical perspective,
if  then when allocating the homogeneous good publically, our corrupt governmentE[sI]/BI>E[sII]/BII
official should discriminate in favor of type II citizens over type I citizens. This discussion provides
us with the answer to the “Why to favor?” question.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we used a queuing theoretic approach to analyze two hitherto unstudied
questions concerning favoritism in the public allocation of goods by means of queuing processes in
developing countries. Specifically, we compared the ratios given in Lemma 1 and showed that a
theoretical case can be made for favoring one type of citizen over the other. Our analysis showed that
the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes received by the corrupt government
official, but also on the efficiency—measured by the expected service times—with which this official
discharges his duties.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what follows,
we suggest four potential extensions. First, we analyzed a model in which there are two types of
citizens. Therefore, one way to extend the analysis in this paper would be to study a model in which
there are n types of citizens where n is any positive integer. Second, in the queuing model of this
paper, we did not allow the magnitude of the bribes paid by citizens within a particular type to vary.
Consequently, it would be useful to analyze a queuing theoretic framework in which this issue is
explicitly modeled. Third, depending on the kind of good being allocated and the geographical
location of the servers, it may be interesting to study bribery and corruption in multi-server queues.
Finally, in any corruption regime, it is always possible that the “victims” of bribery will exert pressure
on the server. In these sorts of situations, game-theoretic modeling approaches are likely to be useful.
12
Studies that analyze these aspects of the problem will strengthen our understanding of the connections
between bribery, favoritism, and wait times in the public allocation of goods by means of queuing
processes in developing countries. 
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